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ABSTRACT
In its Airfreight decision, the European Commission (Commission) fined eleven airlines approximately C799 million for their
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participation in a price-fixing cartel.' This decision is of particular interest because the Commission awarded all carriers a "reduction of 15% on account of the general regulatory
environment in the sector[,] which can be seen as encouraging
price co-ordination. "2
Airlines alleged on appeal that, with regard to certain routes
involving third country destinations, the regulatory environment
did not simply encourage the prohibited behavior, but rather imposed this behavior on the airlines.3 If this ground for appeal succeeds, it would mean that the alleged collusion with regard to
those routes did not constitute an infringement of Article 101 of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)
at all.4
This article first analyzes past reductions in fines under this
category of mitigation and then discusses the "general regulatory environment" that may have led to the reduction in this
case. Since the Commission and the European courts take a robust attitude in this area, the Commission's concession of a 15%
reduction in fines is particularly noteworthy. The article concludes by considering the strength of the airlines' grounds for
appeal based on evidence of the "general regulatory
environment."
I. INTRODUCTION
when imposing fines for
discretion
HE COMMISSION'S
breaches
of the European
Union (EU) competition rules
has been a topical and contentious issue in recent years; in the
Airfreight decision, the Commission exercised its discretion to reduce the fine on all participants due to the "general regulatory

T

I Case COMP/39258, Commission Decision of Sept. 11, 2010 (unpublished).
While a public version of the Airfreight case is not yet available, the Commission
has published a detailed press release that enumerates the various infringements,
the breakdown of fines as notified to each air cargo carrier, and the relevant
adjustments as calculated with or without reference to leniency policies or the
exercise of discretion. See Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission
Fines 11 Air Cargo Carriers C799 Million in Price Fixing Cartel (Nov. 9, 2010),
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-10-1487_en.htm [hereinafter Airfreight Press Release].
2 Airfreight Press Release, supra note 1.
3 Id.
4 See id.; Application ofArticles 101 and 102 TFEU (FormerlyArticles 81 and 82 of the
EC Treaty), EUROPA, http://europa.eu/legislation-summaries/competition/
firms/126092_en.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2013).
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environment."5 This rationale seems to be a novel application of
one of the established grounds for mitigation when setting fines
for infringement of the competition rules. On the one hand,
this raises questions as to the Commission's breadth of discretion in setting fines because, under this head of mitigation, the
Commission has set its own benchmarks as to what degree of
mitigation is appropriate, with little evidence of how it arrives at
a particular figure; further complicating the issue is the fact that
courts are maintaining a deferential approach to review.' On
the other hand, this mitigation adds a new dimension to the
already occasional "special treatment" of some practices in the
aviation sector by competition authorities.'
In the Airfreight case, the Commission also exercised its usual
"powers" of leniency and recidivism uplift.' The whistle-blower,
Lufthansa and subsidiary Swiss International Airlines, received
full immunity under the Commission Leniency Programme,'
whereas the fine for SAS, the Scandinavian carrier, was increased by 50% for its previous infringement in SAS/Maersk
Air.10

At the same time, the Commission exercised its discretion to
reduce the fines." On the basis of the one-way nature of air
cargo shipments, all carriers were given a 50% reduction to take
account of sales on routes where the harm of the cartel fell
outside the European Economic Area (EEA).2 Additionally, the
Commission granted all the carriers a reduction of 15% "on ac-

Airfreight Press Release, supra note 1.
6 See, e.g., Case T-348/08, Aragonesas Industrias y Enegia, SUA v. Comm'n,
2011 E.C.R. 11-7583.
7 See Aviation, TRANSPORT & ENV'T,
http://www.transportenvironment.org/
what-we-do/aviation (last visited Sept. 20, 2013); David Gow, EU Proposes Crackdown on Airlines' Hidden Charges, GUARDIAN (July 17, 2006), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2006/jul/18/travel.money.
8 See Leniency, EUR. COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/leniency/leniency.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2013).
9 British Airways has appealed, inter alia, on the ground that it was given the
lowest fine reduction under the Leniency Programme despite being the first to
come forward. Airfreight Press Release, supra note 1.
10 Commission Decision (EC) No. 716/2001 of 18July 2001, 2001 O.J. (L 265)
15, affd, Case T-241/01, Scandinavian Airlines Sys. AB v. Comm'n, 2005 E.C.R.
11-2917. It is interesting that the recidivist uplift was applied although the earlier
infringement was for market sharing.
11 Airfreight Press Release, supra note 1.
12 Id.
5
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count of the general regulatory environment in the sector[,]
which can be seen as encouraging price co-ordination."' 3
The operation of the cargo and passenger airline industries
raises particular problems for the application of competition
laws because a high degree of coordination between competing
carriers is a requisite for the efficient functioning of the sector.1 4
In the past, international agreements between third countries
and EU Member States have been annulled on the grounds of
(indirect) infringement of EU law.1 5 At the same time, the Commission enacted a number of sector-specific block exemptions
to the competition rules, which were in operation between
199316 and 2007,"1 permitting consultation and agreement between airlines on tariffs.
The factors in the regulatory environment that led the Commission to grant a 15% reduction are unknown because a public
Id.
See generally Commission Regulation 1617/93, 1993 O.J. (L 155) 18.
15 The most notable instances were agreements concluded by Sweden, Finland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark, and the U.K.
with third countries following the Second World War, which the Court ofJustice
of the European Union (CJEU) confirmed infringed upon EU law in two respects: (1) nationality clauses infringed the right of European airlines to nondiscriminatory market access to routes between all Member States and third
countries; and (2) only the EU has the authority to agree to this type of commitment where agreements affect the exercise of EU competence. SeeJoined Cases
C-466/98, C-467/98, C-468/98, C-469/98, C-471/98, C-472/98, C-475/98 & C476/98, Comm'n v. U.K., 2002 E.C.R. 1-9427; Council Regulation 847/2004, 2004
O.J. (L 157) 7, 8. Infringement procedures are ongoing against twelve Member
States. See Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Air Transport: Commission Launches Infringement Procedures Against France, Germany, Austria, and Finland over
Agreements with Russia on Siberian Overflights (Oct. 28, 2010), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-10-1425_ga.htm; Press Release, Eur.
Comm'n, Air Transport: Commission Launches Infringement Procedures
Against Seven Member States over Agreements with Russia on Siberian Overflights (Jan. 27, 2011), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-1174_en.htm?locale=en.
16 Commission Regulation 1617/93, supra note 14.
17 The Commission elected not to renew the block exemptions, which expired
in June 2007 for routes between the EU and the United States or Australia, and
in October 2007 for routes between the EU and other third countries. See Press
Release, Eur. Comm'n, Competition: Commission Ends Block Exemption for
IATA Passenger Tariff Conferences for Routes Between the EU and Non-EU
Countries (June 29, 2007), availableat http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP07-973_en.htm [hereinafter Press Release, Commission Ends Block Exemption].
The International Air Transport Association (IATA) and individual carriers have
13
14

been required since then to ensure that their agreements are compatible with

the general EU competition rules. Id.
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version" of the Airfreight decision is not yet available;" however,
this article attempts to give an account of the "general regulatory environment" within which the sector operates before suggesting how it might encourage price coordination.
Particular air transport agreements between EU Member
States and third countries, which appear to be the bases of some
airlines' appeals, are examined in this article. A number of appeals allege that the prohibited behavior was not simply encouraged by the regulatory environment but was actually imposed
on the airlines."o If this ground for appeal succeeds, it would not
bring about the reduction of fines, but it would result in the
annulment of the relevant part of the Commission's decisionArticles 101 and 102 of the TFEU do not apply where "anti-competitive conduct is required of undertakings by national legislation" or where the national legal framework "eliminates any
possibility of competitive activity on their part."2 1
This article first considers the "general regulatory environment" of the sector through an investigation of its sources
before turning to consider how this could encourage price coordination. A semi-historical examination of the applicability and
application of the EU competition rules to air transport reveals
particular characteristics of the air transport sector that led to
the issuance of sector-specific block exemptions permitting the
18 Gaining access to the Commission's file is often a difficult undertaking. See,
e.g., Case C-404/10 P-Commission v. Editions Odile Jacob SAS, INFoCUR, http:/
/curia.europa.eu/juris/listejsf?language=en&num=C-404/10%20P
(last visited
Sept.21, 2013); C-477/10 P-Commission v. Agrofert, A.S., INFOCURIA, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf)language=en&num=C-477/10%20P (last visited Sept.
21, 2013); Case C-360/09-Pfleiderer AG v. Bundeskartellamt, INFoCURJA, http://
curia.europa.eu/juris/istejsf?language=en&num=C-360/09 (last visited Sept.21,
2013).
19It is not uncommon that evidence produced pursuant to cartel investigations carried out by the Commission later becomes available via civil discovery in
the United States. See Samuel R. Miller et al., U.S. Discovery of European Union and
U.S. Leniency Applications and Other Confidential Investigatory Materials,3 CPI ANTITRUSTJ., Mar. 16, 2010, at 2. It may be argued that the risk that information held
in the Commission's file on Airfreightwould be used in future proceedings against
the relevant air cargo carriers in jurisdictions outside the EU outweighs the benefits of declassifying such information. This article proceeds on the basis that it is
unlikely that a comprehensive, final version of the Commission's decision will be
made available to the public-at least until global cartel investigations, proceedings, and appeals have been concluded in the multiple jurisdictions where these
actions continue.
20 Joined Cases C-359 & C-379/95 P, Comm'n v. Ladbroke Racing, 1997 E.C.R.
1-6265, 6305.
21 Id.
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sharing of information about prices and other types of cooperation that are otherwise illegal under Article 101(1) of the
TFEU.22 While all the block exemptions are now repealed, in
the Airfreight case, the "general regulatory environment" in
which carriers operated mitigated the penalties imposed for
what was a hard-core price-fixing cartel described as
"deplorable" by Vice President for Competition Joaquin
Almunia."
II.

THE DECISION

In November 2010, the Commission fined eleven air cargo
carriers approximately C799 million for "operating a worldwide
cartel which affected cargo services within the [EEA] ."24 The
carriers fined were Air Canada, Air France-KLM, British Airways,
Cathay Pacific, Cargolux, Japan Airlines, LAN Chile, Martinair,
Qantas, SAS, and Singapore Airlines.2 5 The cartel was in operation for six years, from December 1999 to February 14, 2006.26
According to the Commission, the cartel was arranged through
"numerous contacts between airlines, at both [the] bilateral and
multilateral level," covering flights to, from, and within the
EEA.27
In most cases, the air cargo carriers fined in Europe also received fines in other jurisdictions for the same offense and on
similar facts. For instance, the U.S. Department ofJustice (DOJ)
fined a total of twenty-one airlines more than $1.7 billion in
criminal fines and filed criminal charges against nineteen executives in an ongoing investigation into fixing cargo rates-a socalled "conspiracy to restrain trade" in the air cargo transportation services sector of the air transport industry.2" To date, four
executives have been sentenced under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act to serve time in prison, while charges are pending against an
additional three air cargo executives.2 ' Two recent plea agree22 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 101(1), May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47, 88 [hereinafter TFEU].
23 Airfreight Press Release, supra note 1.
24 Id.
25 Id.

26 Id.

Id.
Alicia A. Caldwell, 21 Airlines Fined for Fixing Passengers, Cargo Fees, WASH.
PosT (Mar. 5, 2011, 3:18 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/05/AR2011030501365.html.
29 See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) ("Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
27

28
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ments in the U.S. investigation include Singapore Airlines Cargo
PTE Ltd. and Cargolux; both have agreed to pay criminal fines
of $48 million3 0 and $119 million,3 1 respectively. Singapore Airlines Cargo was also fined $3.3 million by the Competition Commission of South Africa for its involvement in the same
worldwide cartel.32
In the Airfreight case, the Commission found that the air cargo
carriers had contacted each other to ensure that all worldwide
freight carriers would introduce a flat-rate fuel surcharge per
kilo of cargo (price-fixing)." The carriers "extended their cooperation by introducing a security surcharge and refusing to pay a
commission on [these] surcharges to their clients (freight forwarders) ." The Commission stated that "[b]y refusing to pay a
commission, the airlines ensured that surcharges did not become subject to competition through the granting of discounts
to customers."3 5
By agreeing between themselves to pass on the fuel and security surcharges in full and without any discount to the freight forwarders, the airline companies ensured that the freight

among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."). A
breach of U.S. antitrust law carries a maximum penalty of ten years in prison and
a fine of $1 million for an individual, and carries a maximum fine of $10 million
for corporations for offenses committed before June 22, 2004, or $100 million for
offenses committed thereafter. Id. This "may be increased to twice the gain derived from the crime or twice the loss suffered by the victims of the crime, if
either of those amounts is greater than the statutory maximum fine." Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Polar Air Cargo LLC Agrees to Plead Guilty to Price
Fixing on Air Cargo Shipments: Company Agrees to Pay $17.4 Million Criminal
Fine (Sept. 2, 2010), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2010/262145.htm.
30 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Singapore Airlines Cargo PTE Ltd
Agrees to Plead Guilty to Price Fixing on Air Cargo Shipments: Company Agrees
to Pay $48 Million Criminal Fine (Nov. 30, 2010), available at http://www.justice.
gov/atr/public/pressreleases/2010/264634.htm.
31 Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Cargolux Airlines International Airlines
Executives Plead Guilty for Fixing Surcharge Rates on Air Cargo Shipments: Airline Executives to Serve Prison Time (Dec. 8, 2011), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/201 1/2781 33.htm.
32 Harry Suhartono, Singapore Airlines Pays $3.3 Million Fine to S. Africa, REUTERS
(Mar. 26, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/201 2 /0 3 /27/us-singaporeairlines-southafrica-idUSBRE82Q1E20120327.
3 Airfreight Press Release, supra note 1.
34 Id.
35 Id.
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forwarders could not exert competitive pressure on the airlines
to reduce their prices."

A.

SETTING THE FINE

The legal basis of the Commission's "power" to impose fines
on undertakings in breach of EU competition law is Article
23(2) of Regulation 1/2003," which replaced Regulation 17/
62.3 While Article 23(2) (c) stipulates that "the fine shall not
exceed 10% of [an undertaking's] total turnover in the preceding business year," and Article 23(3) stipulates that "[i]n fixing
the amount of the fine,3 regard shall be had both to the gravity
and to the duration of the infringement," within that limitation
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has confirmed that the Commission enjoys a very broad discretion with
respect to the setting of fines in particular cases.40 Regulation 1/
2003 makes clear that fining decisions may be imposed both for
intentional and negligent infringements."
Though the Commission did not originally set out criteria for
the imposition of fines, the level at which fines were set in earlier years was significantly lower than today. 2 There were also
far fewer decisions on cartel infringement; approximately one
cartel was uncovered each year between 1959 and 1998.^^ At the
same time, the Commission's wide discretion in imposing fines
was upheld by the CJEU: "the Commission may at any time ad44
just the level of fines to the needs of [EU competition] policy."
36 According to the Commission, there were four price-fixing cartels between
(1) Europe and the rest of the world; (2) Europe and the United States; (3)
Europe and China; and (4) Europe and Hong Kong. See Press Release, Eur.
Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Imposes C169 Million Fine on Freight Forwarders for Operating Four Price Fixing Cartels (Mar. 28, 2012), available at http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-release IP-12-314_en.htm. The Commission additionally
fined fourteen international freight forwarding companies C169 million for their
collusion on prices on these important international trade lines. Id.
3 Council Regulation 1/2003, art. 23(2), 2003 O.J. (L 1) 17.
38 Council Regulation 17/62, art. 15, 1959-1962 O.J. Spec. Ed. 87, 91-92.
3 Council Regulation 1/2003, supra note 37, art. 23.
40 Joined Cases 100-103/80, Musique Diffusion Francaise SA v. Comm'n, 1983
E.C.R. 1825, 1926; Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines Imposed Pursuant
to Art. 23(2) (a) of Regulation 1/2003, 1 2, 2006 O.J. (C 210) 2 [hereinafter 2006
Guidelines].
41 2006 Guidelines, supra note 40, 1 1.
42 Alan Riley, The Modernisation ofEU Anti-CartelEnforcement: Will the Commission
Grasp the Opportunity?, 31(5) E.C.L.R. 191, 192 (2010).

43

Id.

- Musique Diffusion FranvaiseSA, 1983 E.C.R. at 1906.
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The level of fines imposed for breaches of Articles 101 and
102 of the TFEU rose steeply from the mid-1980s onward.6 In
1998, the Commission, prodded by the concern of the Court of
First Instance (CFI; now the General Court), decided that its
fining criteria should be more transparent 6 and adopted the
1998 Guidelines on the Setting of Fines (1998 Guidelines). 7
Under the 1998 Guidelines, the basic fine amount was calculated according to gravity and duration by first classifying the
infringement as "minor," "serious," or "very serious," depending
on a number of factors.48 A multiplier was applied for duration:
10% per annum or 50% added for cartels subsisting for five or
more years." Then, a number of "aggravating" or "mitigating"
factors were applied, resulting in a lower or higher fine.o
This methodology was refined in the Guidelines on the
Method of Setting Fines Imposed Pursuant to Art. 23(2) (a) of
Regulation 1/2003 (2006 Guidelines)." In the process of setting
the fine, the Commission first determines a basic amount for the
fine. 5 2 This is based on a percentage of the value of the undertaking's sales of affected goods or services within the EEA 5 -a
value that is "determined before [value added tax (VAT)] and
other taxes directly related to the sales"-and is usually calculated with reference to the "last full business year of its participation in the infringement." 54 The percentage applied in any case
is generally up to 30% of the value of sales, and the actual percentage used is determined by the gravity of the infringement;
the gravity of the infringement is assessed by taking into consid45 Riley, supra note 42, at 192-93.
46 Case T-148/89, Tr6filunion v. Commission (Welded Steel Mesh), 1995
E.C.R. 11-1063, 1119, 1 142 ("[T]he Court considers that ... it is desirable for
undertakings-in order to be able to define their position in full knowledge of
the facts-to be able to determine in detail, in accordance with any system which
the Commission might consider appropriate, the method of calculation of the
fine imposed upon them, without being obliged, in order to do so, to bring court
proceedings against the Commission decision.").
4
Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines Imposed Pursuant to Article
15(2) of Regulation No. 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty, 1998 O.J. (C 9)
3-4 [hereinafter 1998 Guidelines].
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 2006 Guidelines, supra note 40, 1 3.
52 Id. 1 10.
53 Id. 1 13.
54 Id.
13, 17 (The fine notice will normally refer to "the sales made by the
undertaking during the last full business year of its participation in the
infringement.").
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eration factors such as the combined market share of all the
undertakings concerned, the geographic scope of the infringement, and the nature of the infringement.55 Hard-core cartels,
such as agreements for horizontal price-fixing, market-sharing,
and output-limitation,5 6 are set at the higher end of the scale.5 7
An innovation introduced by the 2006 Guidelines was the possibility that, for worldwide cartels, the undertaking's share of the
total value of sales, including sales outside the EEA, could be
taken into account, and then that percentage share could be
applied to the value of the EEA sales when determining the fine
for each participant.5 1
The amount arrived at once the percentage of the value of
affected sales has been calculated is then multiplied by the number of years the infringement continued.5 ' This represents a significant increase from the 10% per annum rate of the earlier
regime."o An "entry" deterrent of between 15% and 25% of the
value of sales as defined above is then added to the basic
amount "to deter undertakings from even entering into horizontal price-fixing, market-sharing and output-limitation agreements." 61 This is applied irrespective of duration.6 2
Once the basic amount has been calculated in this way, aggravating or mitigating factors may increase or decrease the fine
levied." A highly significant aggravating factor is recidivism;64
repeat offenders may be fined an additional 100% for each subsequent "similar" infringement (up from the 50% maximum
under the 1998 Guidelines), reflecting the view of the CFI in
Michelin that "[r] ecidivism is a circumstance which justifies a significant increase in the basic amount of the fine. Recidivism
constitutes proof that the sanction previously imposed was not
sufficiently deterrent. "65
In an analysis of thirteen decision made under the 2006
Guidelines, compared with a large sample of decisions between
1999 and 2009 under the 1998 Guidelines, Professor John M.
Id.
19, 21-22.
Id. 23.
57 Id. 11 22-23.
58 Id.
18.
59 Id.
24.
Go See id.; 1998 Guidelines, supra note 47, at 3.
61 2006 Guidelines, supra note 40, 1 25.
62 Id.
63 Id. 11 27-29.
64 Id. 1 28.
65 Case T-203/01, Michelin v. Comm'n, 2003 E.C.R. 11-4071, 4179,
55

56

293.
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Connor concludes that there was a 141% increase in the average
amount of fines. 6 6 He concludes that this was partly due to an
increase in average affected sales, but also due to the tougher
regime introduced by the new guidelines.6 7
It has been calculated that fines for hard-core cartel offenses
were twenty-nine times higher by the end of 2008 than in 1990.68
The steep rise in the level of fines imposed for breaches of Article 101 of the TFEU in the past two decades is shown in the
following chart 9 :
10,000
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9
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The total amount imposed in fines for cartels from 2008 to
2012 was approximately C9.16 billion, with Saint Gobain (car
glass) coming in with the highest fine for a single undertaking
for a cartel infringement at C880 million.7 0 The Airfreight fine of
approximately C799.45 million is the fourth highest total for
one cartel. 1
66 John M. Connor, Has the European Commission Become More Severe in Punishing
Cartels? Effects of the 2006 Guidelines, 32(1) E.C.L.R. 27, 29 (2011).
67 Id.
68 John M. Connor & Douglas J. Miller, The Predictability of Global CartelFines, 2
CONCURRENCES: REV. OF COMPETITION L. (2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1610284 (last visited Oct. 22, 2013).
69 Cartel Statistics, EUR. COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2013).
70 Id.
71 Id.
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The Commission has, as shown above, provided a framework
for the calculation of fines in the 2006 Guidelines. 7 2 The question of whether the legal basis of the fines complies with Article
7 of the European Convention on Human Rights73 (ECHR) continues to be raised.7 ' The recidivism uplift, for example, was increased from a maximum of 50% in the 1998 Guidelines to
100% in the 2006 Guidelines for each additional infringement.7 5 This was decided not on the basis of EU legislation, as
there is no explicit reference to a recidivism penalty in Regulation 1/2003, but by the Commission itself without debate in
any other EU institution. Professor Alan Riley, among many
other commentators, raises the question as to "whether containing such sanctions in an administrative document that can be
changed at will by the executive without legislation complies
with [Article] 7" of the ECHR.
This argument has not been upheld by the European courts
so far.79 However, the General Court has held that the 2006
Guidelines are "rules of practice from which the administration
may not depart in an individual case without giving reasons."80
Furthermore, by adopting and publishing these rules of conduct, the Commission has imposed "a limit on the exercise of its
discretion"; departing from them could breach the general principles of law, such as the right to equal treatment and the protection of legitimate expectations.81 Such rules of conduct "may
produce legal effects."8 2
While the application of the uplift for recidivism has a defined maximum value in the 2006 Guidelines,8 3 there is no indication of what percentage increase or decrease might be applied
2006 Guidelines, supra note 40, 3.
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 7, Nov. 4, 1950, 2013 U.N.T.S. 222.
74 See, e.g., In re Intel Corp., No. 9341, 2010 WL 1634901, at 86 (F.T.C. Apr. 12,
2010).
72
73

75

Cento Veljanouski, Deterrence, Recidivism, and European Cartel Fines, 7(4)
L. & ECON. 871, 889 (2011).

J.

COMPETITION

See generally Council Regulation 1/2003, supra note 37.
2006 Guidelines, supra note 40,
1, 28.
78 Riley, supra note 42, at 204 n.83.
79Joined Cases T-69/04, Schunk GmbH v. Commission, 2008 E.C.R. 11-2567, 1
33.
80 Joined Cases C-189/02 P, 202/02 P, C-205-208/02 P & C-213/02 P, Dansk
Rorindustri v. Comm'n, 2005 E.C.R. I-542S, 11 209, 211.
76
7

81 Id.

211.

82

Id.

83

2006 Guidelines, supra note 40,

1 28.
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for the other aggravating and mitigating factors listed in the
2006 Guidelines-the evaluation of which is apparently for the
Commission to determine on a case-by-case basis."
The other aggravating factors listed that may increase the fine
include: refusal to cooperate with or obstruction of the Commission in carrying out its investigations; having the "role of leader
in, or instigator of, the infringement"; attempting "to coerce
other undertakings to participate"; and taking "any retaliatory
measures. . . against other undertakings with a view to enforc [e]
the practices constituting the infringement."8 5
On the other hand, a number of mitigating circumstances
may lower the fine." One example is when an undertaking provides evidence that its involvement in the infringement was substantially limited; another is when the anti-competitive conduct
of the undertaking has been authorized or encouraged by public authorities or legislation-this is the focus of the discussion
in this article.
It should be borne in mind that there are additional factors
referred to in the 2006 Guidelines that may affect the fine, such
as the inability of the firm to pay in a specific social and economic context,8 8 and the application of the "Leniency Pro-

84 Id. 11 28-29.
85 Id. 1 28.
86 Id. 1 29.
87

Id. Other factors are
where the undertaking concerned provides evidence that it terminated the infringement as soon as the Commission intervened: this
will not apply to secret agreements or practices (in particular, cartels); where the undertaking provides evidence thatjthe infringement has been committed as a result of negligence; where the
undertaking provides evidence that its involvement in the infringement is substantially limited and thus demonstrates that, during the
period in which it was party to the offending agreement, it actually
avoided applying it by adopting competitive conduct in the market
. .. [; and] where the undertaking concerned has effectively cooperated with the Commission outside the scope of the Leniency Notice and beyond its legal obligation to do so.

Id.
88 Id.
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gramme."89 Both of these factors were applied in the Airfreight
case.co
The high fines imposed in the Airfreight case had a particularly
significant impact because the decision was delivered at a time
when airline companies were under extreme economic and
competitive pressure. Controversially, the Commission dropped
charges against eleven other carriers named in the original
Statement of Objections.9 1

B.

FINAL REDUCTION: THE GENERAL REGULATORY
ENVIRONMENT

This section of the article focuses on the uniqueness of the
15% reduction granted to all the participants in the Airfreight
cartel because of the "general regulatory environment" that possibly encouraged price coordination."
As described above, the 2006 Guidelines provide that the
Commission may reduce the basic amount of the fine where
specified mitigating circumstances exist. One circumstance is
"where the anti-competitive conduct of the undertaking has
been authorized or encouraged by public authorities or by legislation."9 3 This ground of mitigation was not included in the
1998 Guidelines, but a fine reduction was given in a number of
89 Id. 1 34. In 1996, the Commission adopted a "Leniency Notice" that set out
the Commission's policy giving immunity or reduced fines to companies that
came forward with information about cartels. Commission Notice on the NonImposition or Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases, 1996 O.J. (C 207) 4, 4. The
Notice was revised in 2002 and again in 2006. Commission Notice on Immunity
from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases, 2002 O.J. (C 45) 3, 3; Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases,
2006 O.J. (C 298) 17, 22 [hereinafter 2006 Leniency Notice]. The 2006 Leniency
Notice gives complete immunity from fines to the first member of a cartel to
provide the Commission with sufficient "information and evidence" to enable it
to launch targeted inspections (dawn raids) on other cartel members. 2006 Leniency Notice, supra,4at 17-18. A cartel member may also qualify for full immunity
by providing sufficient information and evidence to establish an infringement
related to the alleged cartel, but this is only possible if no undertaking has qualified for immunity by the first route. Id. at 18. Other undertakings may qualify for
a reduction in fines by providing evidence that contributes "significant added
value" to the investigation. Id. at 20.
9o See Airfreight Press Release, supra note 1.
91 Id.
92
9

Id.
2006 Guidelines, supra note 40,

1 29.
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cases prior to 2006 because the condemned behavior was encouraged or authorized by national authorities.9 4
This possibility of mitigation of penalties was first raised in the
early case of Suiker Unie v. Commission, where the CJEU recognized that the "organization of the market in sugar ... only left
a residual field available for competition" and that this contributed to the fact that the sugar producers behaved in an anticompetitive manner." The CJEU clarified that although the
structure of the market could not lead to the condoning or acceptance of anti-competitive practices, it did mean "that the [behavior] of the parties concerned cannot be regarded with the
usual severity."" For this reason, inter alia, the fines were
reduced.9 7
The Commission applied such mitigation in the French Beef decision in August 2003.9" In French Beef the parties argued that
the intervention of the French authorities (in encouraging the
conclusion of the prohibited agreement) meant that Article 81
of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC) (Article 101 of the TFEU) was inapplicable; this argument was rejected. 99 However, the Commission agreed "that the French
State, through its Minister for Agriculture, was indeed implicated in the conclusion of the agreement . . . [and] strongly

encouraged the conclusion of an agreement whose content was
necessarily going to be in violation of the competition rules." 00
The Commission therefore awarded mitigation (a reduction of
30% of their fine) to the two trade associations, which refused to
sign the agreement before "the forceful intervention of the
French Minister for Agriculture in [favor] of the conclusion of
such an agreement."10
In Consorio Industrie Fiammiferi (CLF), a judgment 0 2 delivered
just before FrenchBeef in September 2003, the CJEU clarified the
distinction between a situation where the "conduct [was] re94 See Commission Decision, French Beef, 2003 O.J. (L 209) 12, 39 [hereinafter
French Beef Decision].
9
Case 40/73, Suiker Unie v. Comm'n, 1975 E.C.R. 1663, 1 619.
96 Id. 620.
97 See id.
624.
98 See French Beef Decision, supra note 94, at 40.
9 Id. at 36.

10 Id.
10o Id. at 39.
102 See Case C-198/01, Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi
(CIF) v. AutoritA
Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, 2003 E.C.R. 1-8055.
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quired ... by national legislation"'o (so that the undertakings
were required to act in the way that they did, in which case Articles 101 or 102 of the TFEU would not be applicable1 0 4 ) and a
situation where "the conduct was merely facilitated or encouraged by the national legislation" (which would result in a
reduction of the fines imposed).105 This ground of mitigation

was included in the 2006 Guidelines' 0 6 and is also set out in the
Commission Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of
the TFEU to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements. 0 7
The Commission's award of a 10% reduction in fines was recently upheld in Deutsche Telekom AG 08 and Wanadoo Espada v.
Telefdnica,10' two cases decided under Article 102 of the TFEU
that concerned the abuse of unfair pricing through margin
squeeze. In light of the 15% reduction in the Airfreight case,I" it
is interesting to consider the Deutsche Telekom AG case, in which
the Commission's allocation of a 10% reduction in a fine due to
the national regulatory framework was upheld on appeal to the
CJEU."' Deutsche Telekom was found to be in breach of Article
102 of the TFEU and fined C12.6 million for imposing unfair
prices in the form of a margin squeeze."12
Deutsche Telekom AG demonstrates the stringency with which
the Commission, upheld by the CJEU, imposes continued responsibility upon undertakings to assess their own behavior with
regard to the competition law provisions, despite the actions
taken by national authorities. Deutsche Telekom is the former
monopoly provider of telecom services in Germany."' Since Au10

Id.

58.

104 Id. This
105 Id.

point is discussed in further detail below.

2006 Guidelines, supra note 40, 1 29.
Commission Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements,
2011 O.J. (C 11) 1, 8 [hereinafter Commission Guidelines on the Applicability of
TFEU Article 101 to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements].
108 Case C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Comm'n, 2010 E.C.R. 1-9555, 1
264.
109 Case T-336/07, Telef6nica and Telef6nica de Espafila v. Comm'n, 2012
EUR-Lex CELEX 62007T30336 (Mar. 29, 2012) (unpublished).
106

107

110 Airfreight Press Release, supra note 1.

111 Case C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Comm'n, 2010 E.C.R. 1-9555, 1
264.
112 Id. 11 5-6. Margin squeeze can occur where a vertically integrated undertaking controls access to infrastructure (upstream market) that is indispensable
for access to the downstream market in which it also competes and where the
dominant undertaking charges its competitors for access. Id. 4.
us Id. 1 2.
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gust 1996, the German telecommunications market has been
liberalized, and since June 1997, Deutsche Telekom has been
required to provide competitors with fully unbundled access to
the local loop at a "wholesale" price fixed by the national regulatory authority, the Regulierungsbehdrdefur Telekommunikation und
Post (RegTP).H 4 Those competitors were then able to compete
with Deutsche Telekom in the provision of retail services to consumers through analogue lines; they were also able to offer internet access though narrowband and broadband
connections. 1 The ensuing margin squeeze was between the
wholesale prices charged by Deutsche Telekom to its competitors for access to the unbundled local loop and the prices it
charged consumers for retail network access services."'
Despite the facts that the wholesale price was set by the national regulator, that retail prices were subject to authorization
or review by the same regulator, and that the national regulator
investigated allegations of margin squeeze because of complaints by competitors on six occasions and rejected them,
Deutsche Telekom was awarded only a 10% reduction in its fine
due to the national regulatory framework."
Niamh Dunne argues that the problem in this case was an
error in the national regulation": "Ultimately, this case involved the sub-optimal use of competition law to correct a problem caused by inadequate regulation, in circumstances where
the regulation itself was essentially immune from review."119
Id.
Id. Retail network access is provided through either traditional analogue
connection or digital narrowband connection (an integrated services digital network, or ISDN). Id. Access to these is via Deutsche Telekom's existing copper pair
network (narrowband connections). Id. Deutsche Telekom also offers end-users a
broadband connection (an asymmetrical digital subscriber line, or ADSL), which
requires upgrading the existing narrowband connections. Id.
116 Id.
3. The term "'local loop' signifies the physical circuit connecting the
network termination point at a subscriber's premises to the main distribution
frame or equivalent facility in the fixed public telephone network." Id. 1 2.
" Id. 11 264, 279.
us Niamh Dunne, Margin Squeeze: From Broken Regulation to Legal Uncertainty,70
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 34, 36 (2011).
119 Id. at 34-37. It should be noted, however, that the Commission raised the
argument in the appeal before the CJEU that the excessive wholesale price was
attributable to Deutsche Telekom itself. See Deutshe Telekom AG, 2010 E.C.R. I9555, 11 35-40. The regulator had set the wholesale prices with reference to
Deutsche Telekom's submitted costs and Deutsche Telekom failed to inform it
that those costs had decreased; however, the point was not adjudicated because it
had not been raised in the original appeal to the General Court. See id.
114
115
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The breadth of the Commission's discretion in setting fines
for breach of the competition provisions has been subject to
much debate and criticism. When applying this ground of mitigation, the unspecific wording of Article 29 of the 2006 Guidelines has enabled the Commission to set its own benchmark for
what level of reduction in the fine is appropriate for "encouragement" by the national regulatory regime.1 2 0
What is interesting is the very limited impact that national regulation had on the fine in Deutsche Telekom AG.121 By comparison, in the Airfreight case, the reduction for "the general
regulatory environment" was 15%.
Aside from Suiker Unie,1 2 2 the cases referred to above all concern specific actions, administrative decisions, or legislation by
national regulatory authorities. By contrast, in the Airfreight cartel, the 15% reduction was granted to all the carriers "on account of the general regulatory environment in the sector[,]
which can be seen as encouraging price coordination."123 While
in the absence of a published decision the precise characteristics
of the "general regulatory environment" cannot be definitively
established, this does seem to be a novel use of this ground of
mitigation because it is applied to a global regulatory environment rather than to specific, identified actions by national authorities or particular instances of national regulation, as in
earlier cases.1 2 1 It is interesting that this mitigation was extended
to all carriers irrespective of routes and therefore independent
of the specific national regulation regulating particular

routes. 125
III.

REGULATING AIR TRANSPORT

As demand for air transport services increases, new airlines
enter the market and existing airlines offer new routes or frequencies. Where this demand involves international travel, airlines typically depend on their respective governments to
negotiate reciprocal, bilateral traffic rights vis-a-vis air service
120
121
122
123

124
125

2006 Guidelines, supra note 40, 1 29.
Deutsche Telekom AG, 2010 E.C.R. 1-9555, 1 279.
Case 40/73, Suiker Unie v. Comm'n, 1975 E.C.R. 1663.
Airfreight Press Release, supra note 1.
Id.
Id.
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agreements (ASAs) .126 It follows that dialogue between airlines
and regulators is essential to effective operation of the industry.
The air transport sector comprises two key business segments:
passengers and cargo. Virtually all airlines have at least smallscale freight operations while some airlines perform strictly
cargo operations.1 2 7 Passenger airline services typically involve
two parties: the passenger and the airline, and perhaps the passenger's travel agent. Shipping by air, on the other hand, requires at least three parties: the sender, the carrier, and the
consignee. Plus, in many instances, freight forwarders, consolidators (or "bulk-break agents"), and customs authorities may
be involved.12 8
It should be noted that the Chicago Convention introduced
nine "freedoms of the air" in 1944,129 the first five of which were
subsequently adopted as express terms in most bilateral ASAs.
The first ever ASA was the former Bermuda I Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom (U.K.) in
1946, which, together with the subsequent Bermuda II Agreement, set out which airlines could access which airports and with
what frequency. 3 o
A.

AIR SERVICE AGREEMENTS

In February 2011, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) published its Regulated Conduct
See, e.g., Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat.
1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
127 Massimo Geloso Grosso & Ben Shepherd, LiberalisingAir Transport Services in
APEC 12 (Groupe D'Economie Mondiale, Working Paper, 2009), available at
www.ecipe.org/media/publication-pdfs/GelosoGrossoShepherdLiberalising.
aircargo-services inAPEC102009.pdf.
128 See id. at 7.
129 Chicago Convention, supra note 126, arts. 10-13.
130 Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States of America Relating to Air Services Between Their
Respective Territories, U.S.-U.K, Feb. 11, 1946, 60 Stat. 1499 [hereinafter Bermuda I ASA]. Signed in 1946, the Bermuda I ASA is an example of a "traditional"
bilateral air service arrangement following the Chicago Convention between
post-war aeronautical powers such as the United States and the U.K. See id. In
1977, the Bermuda II ASA amended the terms of the previous agreement and
outlined, for instance, which airlines were permitted to fly to London's Heathrow
and Gatwick airports from designated U.S. cities. Consolidated Air Services
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
U.S.-U.K, July 23, 1977, 28 U.S.T. 5367 [hereinafter Bermuda II ASA].
126

560

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[ 78

Defence,'"' which discusses the Commission's Airfreight decision
in the context of bilateral ASAs "between the EU and third
countries [that] . . . still contain restrictive clauses requiring des-

ignated carriers to agree on fares before filing them with Aviation Authorities." 3 2
This would seem to be in breach of the clear duty imposed on
national aeronautical authorities by the CJEU in 1986 in the Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen case to "refrain from taking any measure
which might be construed as encouraging airlines to conclude
tariff agreements contrary to the Treaty."'
For the most part, the air transport sector remains regulated
by a "complex web" of restrictive bilateral and reciprocal
ASAs.'" Airlines called on governments in 2008 to reduce impediments to trade, specifically calling for greater liberalization
of cargo ASAs."

There is a general trend toward liberalization of ASAs with
new bilateral and multilateral ASAs agreed on "open skies"
terms-allowing unrestricted service between the two or more
state signatories, particularly with regard to passenger services.' 6 Notwithstanding that there are an estimated 3,000 ASAs
currently in force, and that analyzing these ASAs presents a challenge, a number of empirical studies have been conducted'
that assess the extent of liberalization using the Cargo Air Liberalization Index (CALI).'1" From these studies, it is apparent that
the regulatory framework is liberalizing at the international
level, albeit gradually."'
Most U.S.-negotiated open skies agreements contain specific
provisions that apply to all-cargo operations (freighters), but not
131 POLICY
ROUND
TABLES:
REGULATED
CONDUCT
DEFENCE,
DAF/
COMP(2011)3, OECD 2? 3 (2011), availableat http://www.oecd.org/regreform/
sectors/48606639.pdf.
132 Id. at 199.
'3 Case C-66/86, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen v. Zentrale zur Bekdmpfung un48-49
lauteren Wettbewerbs E.V., 1989 E.C.R. 803, 852, 4 C.M.L.R. 102,
(1990).
134 PAsCAL ACHARD,

THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL AIR CARGO SERVICES,

(2009), available at http://www.gem.sciences-po.fr/content/research_topics/trade/RITS/AchardRegulation ofInternationalAirCargoServices062009.pdf.
135 See Istanbul Declaration, INT'L AIR TRANSPORT Ass'N
(Mar. 2, 2008),
www.iata.org/events/agm/2008/Pages/istanbul-declaration.aspx.
136 Grosso & Shepherd, supra note 127, at 3.
137 ACHARD, supra note 134, at 17.
138 Id.
13 Grosso & Shepherd, supra note 127, at 3.
SCIENCESPO
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belly cargo (mixed passenger-cargo services); the all-cargo provisions are typically more liberal than those for passenger services.' 4 0 Cargo tends to be regulated differently from passenger
services, as the former is by definition unidirectional because
the majority of consignments travel only one-way."' In global air
transport, this leads to a situation where airline operations are
comprised of passenger and cargo divisions of "unbalanced"
cargo yet "balanced" passengers.'
The ASAs negotiated in the past between Member States and
third countries tended to be more restrictive than the new wave
of open skies and multilateral agreements negotiated by the
EU.14 3 Certain bilateral ASAs between EU Member States and
third countries established the "regulatory" process for setting
tariffs, and these were less "liberalized" than the new EU-mandated ones.'" This is relevant to note in connection with the
assumption, which Pascal Achard has proven empirically, that
more liberal ASAs are linked to higher trade flows. 14 5

B.

EUROPEAN AIR TRANSPORT

Air transport is mentioned only once in the TFEU, in Article
100, which provides that:
(1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to transport by rail,
road and inland waterway.
(2) The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, may lay down appropriate provisions for sea and air transport.They shall act after
consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.' 6
The legal framework of the EU as it relates to air transport is
two-fold: the sector is now subject to the general rules on competition (under Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU)14 7 just as all
140 AcHARD,

supra note 134, at 21.
Anming Zhang & Yimin Zhang, A Model of Air Cargo Liberalisation:Passenger
vs. All-Cargo Carriers, 38 TRANsP. REs. PART E LoGisTics & TRANSP. REV., 175, 7
(2002).
142 AcHARD, supra note 134, at 14-16.
14
Id. at 18-19.
144 Id. at 19.
145 Id. at 41.
146 TFEU, supra note 22, art. 100 (emphasis added).
147 Id. arts. 101-02.
141
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other sectors, but air transport policy is determined by the European Parliament and the European Council (Council)."*

The four main objectives of the EU's air transport regulatory
framework are: "facilitating the airlines' financing ability"; "ensuring the respect of the internal market rules"; "creating conditions for fair and equitable competition"; and "extending the
liberalization policy to third-country routes." 1 4 9
European air transport policy has matured over the past decade and a half, during which time the EU air transport market
has been liberalized incrementally vis-A1-vis three internal market
"liberalization packages"; the final package came in 1993,
though arguably the market was not fully liberalized until
2004.150 In any case, the packages influenced more overt national
markets and created the single European air transport market
and the "Single European Sky."1 51 Until 1993, there was much
debate on the appropriate application of the competition rules
to the industry, but the best argument for the delay was that the
sector was not yet sufficiently liberalized, and therefore, the EU
competition rules would have had little or no real effect.
However, a highly significant case in 1985, Nouvelles
Frontidres,'5 2 confirmed that the competition rules did indeed apply to the air transport sector. At the same time, it established
that prior to the adoption of legislation under Article 87 of the
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC
Treaty), national courts could not apply Articles 85(1) and
85(2) of the EEC Treaty (now Articles 101(1) and 101(2) of the
TFEU) to hold an anticompetitive agreement void, unlike the
148 Id. art. 100.

149 STEVEN TRUXAL, COMPETITION AND REGULATION IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY:
PUPPETS IN CHAOs 82 (2013). This includes the on-going problem of state aid
being offered to flag carriers by the respective Member States.
150 See Market Integration Theory, EUR. COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/transport/
modes/air/internal-market/integration-en.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2013). It is
reasonably argued that the liberalization of the internal EU market for air transport was not completed until the CJEU "open skies" judgments in 2002 and indeed not fully liberalized until the transfer of exclusive (external) competence
for EU external air transport in 2004. See id.
151 See Single European Sky, EUR. COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/transport/
modes/air/single-european sky/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2013). This denotes a single European commercial airspace under the management of Eurocontrol, the
body empowered by the EU to control air traffic for the entire Union. See id.; see
also Council Decision 2004/636/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 304) 204.
152 Joined Cases 209-213/84, Ministare Public v. Lucas Asjes, 1986 E.C.R. 1425.
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situation in other areas where the national courts could directly
apply the Articles. 15
During the liberalization of the EU air transport sector, the
Commission devised a number of legal measures to apply EU
competition law to the sector in a gradual and effective manner.
The liberalization process encouraged an incremental relinquishing of Member State controls in the sector and vested future oversight centrally in the EU. This process is perhaps best
demostrated by the area of market access and traffic rights.
"Council Decision 87/602 under the first phase of the liberalization process and Council Regulation 2343/90 were 'measures
designed to introduce greater freedom of access to air transport
markets to bring about a single market for air transport, albeit
gradually."' 1 5 4 These regulations "assign [ed] substantive rights
and obligations to individual Member States and the [EU with
respect to EU] air transport, in particular . .. free market access

to all intra[-EU] air routes." 5 5
As part of the third and final phases of liberalization, a number of regulations aimed to: ensure equal market access and
traffic rights for all designated EU carriers; provide an appropriate procedure and relevant criteria for the licensing of EU carriers; ensure air fares and cargo rates are deregulated; develop a
code of conduct for computer reservations systems (CRSs); and
establish procedural rules for the application of the competition
rules on state aid in the air transport sector.15 6

153 Id. National courts could only apply the competition provisions if (1) there
had been a prior ruling of infringement by the "competent authority" of a Member State, acting under the interim provision of Article 88 of the EEC Treaty, that
there had been a breach of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, or (2) where the Commission, acting under Article 89(2) of the EEC Treaty, on application by a Member State or on its own initiative, had investigated and found an infringement. Id.
If the infringement was not brought to an end, the Commission could record the
infringement in a "reasoned decision" and authorize the Member State to take
measures. Id. The Commission had no power itself to take action against an undertaking to compel it to bring an infringement to an end. Id.
154 TRUXAL, supra note 149, at 83.
155 Id. Council Regulation 2408/92 "subsequently amended these provisions
under the third wave of the [EU]'s market liberalization process." Id. at 83 n.109.
156 See Council Regulation 323/1999, 1999 O.J. (L 40) 1; Council Regulation
2409/92, 1992 Oj. (L 240) 15, 15-16; Council Regulation 2408/92, 1992 O.J. (L
240) 8, 8-9; Council Regulation 2407/92, 1992 O.J. (L 240) 1, 1-2; Application
of Articles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty and Article 61 of the EEA Agreement to
State Aids in the Aviation Sector, 1994 Oj. (C 350) 5, 8.
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Following the Nouvelles Frontidrecase and the three liberalizadon packages, Council Regulation 3975/87157 established the
procedure for applying the rules on competition to undertakings in the air transport sector.158 The Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen'5 9
case came to the CJEU soon after the enactment of Regulation
3975/87-which allowed the Commission to take action in the
air transport sector under Articles 85(1) and (2) of the EEC
Treaty, thereby establishing the procedure for applying for an
individual exemption-and Regulation 3976/87-a block exemption covering certain categories of agreements and concerted sector practices, such as consultations.1 6 "Consultations
on tariffs or fares are [a] common, worldwide practice in the
airline industry."1 6' "These consultations are held on a bilateral
or multilateral conference basis."' 6 2
The CJEU held that the enactment of Regulation 3976/87
meant that Articles 85(1) and 85(2) of the EEC Treaty (now
Articles 101(1) and 101(2) of the TFEU) could be applied by
the national courts directly, as it was now possible for the courts
to apply Article 85(3) at the same time.' 6 3 An anti-competitive
agreement would therefore be automatically void without a find157 Council Regulation 3975/87, 1987 O.J. (L 374) 1, 2. This created the "general regulation" (Council Regulation 17/62) for the implementation of EU competition law to the air transport sector. Id.; see Council Regulation 17/62, supra
note 38. Article 1 empowered the Commission to apply the rules directly to intraCommunity routes. Council Regulation 3975/97, supra. Council Regulations
1284/91 and 2410/92 amended Regulation 3975/87. See Council Regulation
2410/92,1992 O.J. (L 240) 18; Council Regulation 1284/91, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 2.
158 This procedure was amended by Council Regulation 2410/92 and subsequently repealed and replaced by Council Regulation 411/2004. See Council Regulation 411/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 68) 1, 2; Council Regulation 2410/92, supra note
157.
159 Case C-66/86, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen v. Zentrale zur Bekilmpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs E.V., 1989 E.C.R. 803, 852, 4 C.M.L.R. 102, 1 48 (1990).
160 See Council Regulation 3976/87, 1987 O.J. (L 374) 9, 10.
161 The CJEU "recognized the need to distinguish between price-fixing and
'consultation' on tariffs" but admitted that this is not an easy distinction to draw.
TRUXAL, supra note 149, at 76. Consultation on tariffs was exempted from Article
101(1) under Regulation 2671/88. See id. Consultation must be intended solely to
prepare joint tariff proposals, which are not binding on the participants, who
must remain free to put forward different tariff proposals to the relevant aeronautical authorities and then to apply those alternative tariffs; additionally, participation in consultations must be open to all air carriers with an interest in the
relevant routes. See id.
162 "The major international conference for scheduling and fares is held biannually in June and November under the framework and oversight of IATA." Id.
163 Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen, 1989 E.C.R. at 845, 4 C.M.L.R. 1 20.
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ing by the competent authorities under Articles 88 or 89.164
However, this was only true with regard to flights between EU
airports.1 6 5 Breaches of the competition laws with respect to domestic flights and flights between Member States and third
countries could not be enforced by national courts but rather
only vis-1-vis transitional rules under Articles 88 and 89.166
This situation was remedied by the enactment of Regulation
411/2004, which repealed Regulation 3975/87 and extended
the Commission's powers of investigation and enforcement with
respect to flights between Member States and third countries.1 6 7
In other words, by 2004, the competition laws were finally applicable to the entire air transport sector on the same basis as other
industries.
Two further reforms aimed at standardization of the regulations applicable to different routes were the adoption of Common Position 7/2004, which sets out the appropriate procedure
for the future negotiation and implementation of multilateral
ASAs between Member States and third countries,16 and Regulation 847/2004, which provides for the compatible standardization of pre-existing bilateral ASAs between Member States and
non-EU countries.1 6 9
In relation to the EU's external aviation policy, the Council
welcomed comprehensive agreements: "[T]he inseparable twin
aims of comprehensive open aviation area agreements should
be, on the one hand, market opening creating new economic
opportunities and investment possibilities, and, on the other
hand, a process of regulatory convergence that ensures a satisfactory level playing field with fair and equitable competition
conditions."17 0
The Council also urged the Commission to "bring the current
negotiations with the United States to a successful and mutually
satisfactory conclusion as early as possible"; the result of these
See id. at 845, 1 21.
Id.
166 See id.
167 Council Regulation 411/2004, supra note 158, at 1-2 (repealing Regulation
3975/87 and amending Regulations 3976/87 and 1/2003, in connection with air
transport between the Community and third countries).
168 Council Common Position (EC) No. 7/2004 of 5 Dec. 2003, 2004 O.J. (C
54 E) 33; see also Council Regulation 868/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 162) 1.
169 See Council Regulation 847/2004, supra note 15, at 8.
170 Council Conclusions on Developing the Agenda for the Community's External Avia164
165

tion Policy, at 4, COM (2005) 79 final (Mar. 11, 2005).
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negotiations -was the EU-U.S. "Open Skies" Agreement, which
came into force in March 2008.171

C.

BLOCK EXEMPTIONS

Particularly noteworthy is the special treatment of the airline
industry in the context of block exemptions issued in the 1980s
and 1990s that exempted agreements on pooling revenue, limiting of capacities, and tariffs' 7 2 -clear infringements of Article
101(1) of the TFEU. Commission Regulation 1617/93, which renewed Regulation 2671/88, exempted from Article 101 (1) "certain categories of agreements and concerted practices
concerning joint planning and coordination of schedules, joint
operations, consultations on passenger and cargo tariffs on
scheduled air services," and slot allocation at airports with the
aim of facilitating "interlining," subject to certain a priori
conditions.1 7 3
Initially, cargo tariff consultations "benefited [from] a block
exemption under Commission Regulation 1617/93, which effectively enabled European airlines to agree on tariffs for the carriage of freight."' 7 In 1996, however, the Commission removed
cargo operations from the scope of the block exemption.17 5 Exemptions with respect to passenger airline operations continued
but were amended five times between 1993 and 2002.176
The Commission reviewed and renewed a series of revised
block exemptions for passenger airlines via the International Air
Transport Association (IATA) in October 2006 under Block Exemption Regulation (EC) No. 1459/2006, resulting in a reduction of the scope of the exemptions.' 7 7 Finally, the Commission
decided not to renew either the block exemptions expiring in
June 2007 for routes between the EU, United States, and Austra171 Id.

at 5.
See Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Commission Takes Preliminary View that
IATA Cargo Tariff Consultations Infringe Competition Rules (May 15, 2001),
available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release IP-01-694_en.htm [hereinafter
Press Release, Commission Takes Preliminary View].
173 Commission Regulation 1617/93, supra note 14, at 18-19; see TRUXAL, supra
note 149, at 92.
174 Press Release, Commission Takes Preliminary View, supra note 172.
175 Commission Regulation 1523/96, 1996 0.J. (L 190) 11, 12.
176 See Commission Regulation 1105/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 167) 6; Commission
Regulation 1324/2001, 2001 0.J. (L 177) 56; Commission Regulation 1083/1999,
1999 0.J. (L 131) 24; Commission Regulation 1523/96, supra note 175; Commission Regulation 1617/93, supra note 14.
177 Commission Regulation 1459/2006, 2006 0.J. (L 272) 3, 3-5.
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lia, or the block exemptions expiring in October 2007 for routes
between the EU and other third countries on the grounds that
the benefits to consumers were outweighed by the anti-competitive effects.17 As a result, the IATA and individual carriers have
been required since 2007 to ensure that their agreements are
fully compliant with EU competition rules.1 7 1
D.

AIRLINE AND CARGO ALLIANCES

An airline alliance, which in essence is a cooperative agreement between two or more airlines, is typically established as a
means to extend and optimize flight networks, reduce costs, and
offer greater benefits to consumers.81 o The level of cooperation
between partners to an airline alliance varies from sharing frequent flyer programs or airport lounges, to establishing minimum standards for crew uniforms, seat comfort, and in-flight
services, to one airline making a stock investment in its partner.'81 Many alliances "began as codeshare agreements aimed at
extending existing flight networks and have subsequently developed into regional or global alliances." 8 Alliances involving socalled codeshare agreements may have the potential for both
pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects.18' "On the [procompetitive] side, they can create new service, improve existing
service, lower costs, and increase efficiency, all to the benefit of
consumers. On the [anti-competitive] side, they can result in
market allocation, capacity limitations, higher fares, or foreclosure of rivals from markets, all to the injury of consumers."' 8 4
Perhaps the most significant development "in recent years has
been the emergence of a grouping of major carriers in the form
of deeper and more complex alliances extending to all aspects
178 See id. at 4-5.
179 Press Release, Commission Ends Block Exemption, supra note 17.
180 See TRUXAL, supra note 149, at 136.

181 InternationalAviation Alliances: Market Turmoil and the Future of Airline Competition: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition & Bus. Rights of the S.
Comm. on theJudiciary, 107th Cong. 6 (2001) (statement of R. Hewitt Pate, Deputy
Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div.) [hereinafter Pate Hearing].
182 TRUXAL, supra note 149, at 137.
183 A "codeshare" occurs when one airline operates a service but allows another to offer that service for purchase under its flight designator code. Pate Hearing, supra note 181, at 5.
184 Id. at 6.
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of the airline business." 8 The three largest global airline alliances are Star Alliance, One World, and Sky Team. 18 6
Lufthansa Cargo and its passenger side, Lufthansa German
Airlines, belong to Star Alliance, capturing the alliance's additional members as potential partners for joint cargo operations.1 7 This means that whatever agreements the passenger
airline enters into may incorporate its cargo business as well,
whether the agreement is a codeshare with another passenger
(integrated) airline or a block space agreement with an all-cargo
carrier, such as DHL.
The capacities of global air cargo alliances are remarkable,
particularly since freight is time-sensitive rather than based on
loyalty or preference, as with passenger flights. Sky Team Cargo,
with its members Aero Mexico, Air France, Alitalia, Czech Airlines, Delta Air Logistics, and Korean Air, carried 2.093 million
tons of international freight combined in 2002.88
The Commission has investigated a number of joint ventures
undertaken by members of alliances. More recently, in January
2012, the Commission launched an investigation into whether a
transatlantic joint venture between Air France-KLM, Alitalia,
and Delta-members of the Sky Team alliance-infringes Article 101 of the TFEU.18 9 Another investigation into transatlantic
cooperation between Air Canada, Lufthansa, Continental Airlines, and United Airlines-members of the Star Alliance-was
started in 2009 and is still ongoing."'o

E.

SPECIAL TREATMENT

The air transport sector is inherently information sharing. Examples include: network and fare conferences, which in the past
185

TRUXAL, supra note 149, at 137.

Id.
About Lufthansa, STAR ALLANCE, http://www.staralliance.com/en/about/
airlines/lufthansa airlines/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2013).
188 Aaron Karp, Airlines PairingOff 94 AIR CARGO WORLD 20, 25 (2004) (citing
IATA figures).
189 See Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Opens a Probe into
Transatlantic Joint Venture Between Air France-KLM, Alitalia and Delta and
Closes Proceedings Against Eight Members of Sky Team Airline Alliance (Jan. 27,
2012), availableat http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-12-79_en.htm.
190 See Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Opens Formal Proceedings Against Certain Members of Star and Oneworld Airline Alliances (Apr.
20, 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release MEMO-09-168_en.
htm.
186
187
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had antitrust immunity;' the publication of fares, which often
leads to so-called "fare wars"; and a trend toward cooperative
arrangements between airlines in the form of strategic alliances. 19 2 It can also be argued that the existing coordination between airlines through interline agreements 93 demonstrates
that the mechanics of the practical operation of the global air
network requires cooperation.
It seems therefore that the current regulatory environment
has required the industry to introduce changes to its structure
so as to ensure a level of workable competition on par with that
which is expected in other industries. One must be mindful that
the air transport sector possesses unique characteristics, and although it is not the aim of this article to elaborate on that point,
it is interesting to consider the phenomenon of strategic, increasingly intimate worldwide alliances forming within this regulatory space.194
IV.

THE APPEALS

The following section offers an analysis of the regulatory
framework within which the sector currently operates, focusing
on those aspects that might be considered to "encourage" price
coordination.
Four of the appeals lodged against the Commission's decision
have raised, inter alia, the state action defense in relation to certain flights between EU Member States and third countries, arguing that state regulation precluded application of the
competition rules and therefore there was no breach of Article
101 of the TFEU; those appeals have been brought by Deutsche
19, See Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Competition: Commission Revises Block
Exemption for IATA Passenger Tariff Conferences (Oct. 2, 2006), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-06-1294_en.htm.
192 See Joe Sharkey, Forget the Airlines' Name; It's All About Alliances, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 5, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/06/business/global/forgetthe-airlines-name-its-all-about-alliances.html.
193 "Interlining is an agreement between two carriers, under which each carrier may accept the other's tickets in exchange for transport." TRUXAL, supra note
149, at 121. Passengers therefore have the opportunity to travel with one airline's
tickets on flights operated by many other carriers worldwide. See id. The interline
agreement may thus be seen as an industrial construct; "the arrangement is fundamental to the operation of the industry from both a corporate and competition perspective." Id.
194 See id.
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and Singapore

STATE ACTION

A possible defense to a finding of infringement of the competition rules is the "state action" defense: if anticompetitive conduct is required of undertakings by national legislation or if
national legislation creates a regulatory framework that eliminates any possibility of competitive activity, the competition
rules will not apply.'
This defense was first raised successfully in Suiker Unie, where
it was held that Italian regulation of the sugar market left no
scope for competition and the Commission's finding of an infringement of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty was thus annulled.oo
The defense has been raised on many occasions since then, generally without success.o 1
The law was clarified in CIF,where the question arose whether
a national competition authority (NCA) that has found a breach
of the competition rules by national legislation is authorized or
indeed obliged to disapply the offending provisions.2 0 2 The
CJEU, citing Fratelli Costanzo, held that the obligation to disapply
national law that conflicts with EU law applies not only to national courts but also to all organs of the state, including administrative bodies. 0
In CIF, the CJEU held that undertakings that have infringed
upon EU competition rules as a result of complying with national legislation would not be "accountable" for that infringement for the period when the national legislation is in force.2 0 4
195 Case T46/11, Deutsche Lufthansa v. Comm'n, 2011 O.J. (C 80) 31.
Case T-38/11, Cathay Pac. Airways v. Comm'n, 2011 O.J. (C 72) 32.
19 Case T-48/11, British Airways v. Comm'n, 2011 O.J. (C 80) 32.
198 Case T43/11, Singapore Airlines and Singapore Airlines Cargo PTE v.
Comm'n, 2011 O.J. (C 89) 21.
199 See, e.g., Case 40/73, Suiker Unie v. Comm'n, 1975 E.C.R. 1663.
200 Id. [
36-73.
201 See, e.g., Commission Decision 85/206, Aluminum Imports from Eastern
Europe, 1985 O.J. (L 92) 1.
202 Case C-198/01, Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi (CIF) v. Autoriti Garanie
della Concorrenza e del Mercato, 2003 E.C.R. 1-8055.
203 Id.; see also Case
C-66/86, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen v. Zentrale zur
Bekampfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs E.V., 1989 E.C.R. 803, 852, 4 C.M.L.R. 102,
1 49 (1990).
204 Consorzio Industrie Frammifui (CIF), 2003 E.C.R. 1-8055,
51.
196
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This was due to the EU general principle of "legal certainty." 205
The CJEU held that the national law constitutes a 'justification
which shields the undertakings concerned from all the consequences of an infringement of Articles 81 [TEC] and 82
[TEC ."206 However, this protection will no longer apply once
the NCA has made a decision that the national law is contrary to
the competition rules and has disapplied it.
The most recent formulation of the defense comes from
Deutsche Telekom. 207 Where "anti-competitive conduct is required
of undertakings by national legislation, or if the latter creates a
legal framework which itself eliminates any possibility of competitive activity on their part," Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU
do not apply because "the restriction of competition is not attributable, as those provisions implicitly require, to the autonomous conduct of the undertakings." 20 8
The CJEU makes clear, however, that Articles 101 and 102 of
the TFEU will apply if the national legislation leaves scope for
the possibility of competition; it points out that the defense has
"been accepted only to a limited extent by the Court of Justice,"
meaning that it has been narrowly interpreted.2 09
The judgment continues, stating that if national law merely
encourages or makes it easier for undertakings to engage in
anti-competitive conduct, the competition rules will be applied,
and the undertakings will be found to be in breach. 21 0 However,
as we have seen, such encouragement or facilitation of a breach
of the rules by the national authorities may lead to mitigation of
the severity of the fines imposed, at the Commission's
discretion.
It seems that the failure of the national authorities to explicitly annul or disapply bilateral ASAs requiring agreement on tariffs between airlines may be significant in the consideration of
this defense, as will be explored below.
In the absence of a published decision in the Airfreight case,
the final part of this article considers how ASAs between EU
Member States and third counties provided a regulatory frameId. 1 53.
Id. 54.
207 See also Commission Guidelines on the Applicability of TFEU Article 101 to
Horizontal Co-operation Agreements, supra note 107, 1 22.
208 Case C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Comm'n, 2010 E.C.R. 1-9555,
80.
209 Id. 1 81.
210 Id.
82.
205

206
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work governing air transport that has raised the possibility of
this defense. If successfully pleaded, this defense would result in
the annulment of relevant parts of the infringement decision
itself. This discussion involves an examination of a selection of
ASAs, with a focus on those between the U.K and third-country
jurisdictions that regulated the airspace in which the air carriers
in the Airfreight case operated.
Cathay Pacific argues that "l[t]he vast majority of events reported in the decision against the applicant . . . do not amount
to an infringement as they relate to the exchange of publicly
available information [or] are part of a mandated collective regulatory approval process."2 1 ' This airline also challenges the
Commission's finding that
the applicant was not required to participate in the collective application process in seeking the approval of surcharges by the
Civil Aviation Department (CAD) of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) of the People's Republic of China
(PRC).... [C]arriers were required to agree on the details of the
collective applications, including the amount of the surcharge
for which approval was sought and were bound to charge the
surcharges fixed by the CAD.
It further appeals the Commission's rejection of "the state compulsion defen[s]e" with regard to "the applicant's conduct in
Hong Kong (and India, Sri Lanka, Japan, the Philippines and
Singapore)."213

Singapore Airlines appeals on the ground that the Commission failed to take into account the fact that in a number of
foreign jurisdictions, the allegedly illegal "conduct was actively
supervised and effectively required by government agencies." 2 14
Also, Lufthansa appeals on the ground that "government intervention in a number of relevant jurisdictions precludes the application of Article 101 [TFEU]."21
Case T-38/11, Cathay Pac. Airways v. Comm'n, 2011 O.J. (C 72) 32, 1 1.
Id. at 33, 2.
213 Id. at 33, 1 3. It also appealed on the ground that "the Commission erred in
law in its treatment of the regulatory regime in Hong Kong in comparison with
the relevant equivalent regulatory regime in Dubai. It should have excluded Cathay Pacific and Hong Kong on a similar basis as it excluded Dubai from the
scope of the infringement." Id. at 33, 1 5.
214 Case T-43/11, Singapore Airlines and Singapore Airlines Cargo PTE v.
Comm'n, 2011 O.J. (C 89) 21, 21-22, 1 3.
215 Case T-46/11, Deutsche Lufthansa v. Comm'n, 2011 O.J. (C 80) 31, 1 4.
211
212
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Four other airlines have challenged the 15% reduction of
fines on the ground that 15% was "manifestly insufficient, "216 or
that it was insufficient on the grounds of breach of "the principles of proportionality,"2 1 7 or of both proportionality and equal
treatment. 21s

B.

ASAs

REVIEWED-U.K. AND THIRD COUNTRIES

In this section, we identify and review documentary evidence
of the terms of ASAs between the U.K. and seven non-EU countries (Japan, Thailand, India, Brazil, Singapore, Hong Kong,
and South Korea).21 9 In all instances, the U.K and the respective third country have agreed to an ASA. Subsequently, in most
cases, the two national authorities have amended the ASA,
signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) amending the
ASA, or communicated new terms by official letter.
The current status of relations in air services between the U.K
and the countries listed above is mixed. First, since 1950, designated airlines operating routes between the U.K and Thailand
have been required to set fares through the IATA unless otherwise agreed by airlines. 2 Second, designated airlines were required to reach agreement regarding tariffs on flights between
See Case T-62/11, Air France-KLM v. Comm'n, 2011 O.J. (C 95) 8, 9, 1 12.
See Case T-67/11, Martinair Holland v. Comm'n, 20110.J. (C 95) 9, 10, 1 2;
Case T-36/11, Japan Airlines v. Comm'n, 2011 Oj. (C 80) 25, 26, 1 3.
218 See Case T-28/11, Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij (KLM) v. Comm'n,
2011 O.J. (C 72) 30, 31, 1 4.
219 These countries were selected on the basis of their mention in one or more
of the airlines' appeals of the Commission decision. Agreement for Air Services,
U.K.-Japan, Dec. 29, 1952, 175 U.N.T.S. 130 [hereinafter U.K-Japan ASA];
Agreement for Air Services Between and Beyond Their Respective Territories,
U.K.-Thai., Nov. 10, 1950, 96 U.N.T.S. 94 [hereinafter U.K-Thailand ASA];
Agreement Relating to Air Services, U.K-India, Dec. 1, 1951, 12 U.N.T.S. 40
[hereinafter U.K-India 1951 ASA]; Air Transport Agreement, U.K-Brazil, Oct.
31, 1946, 11 U.N.T.S. 116 [hereinafter U.K.-Brazil ASA]; Agreement for Air Services Between and Beyond Their Respective Territories, U.K.-Sing., Jan. 12,
1971, 788 U.N.T.S. 146 [hereinafter U.K.-Singapore ASA]; Agreement Between
the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland Concerning Air Services, U.K-H.K., July 25, 1997, 2050
U.N.T.S. 211 [hereinafter U.K.-Hong Kong ASA]; Agreement for Air Services
Between and Beyond Their Respective Administrative Territories, U.K-S. Kor.,
Mar. 5, 1984, 1416 U.N.T.S. 160 [hereinafter U.K.-South Korea ASA].
220 See U.K-Thailand ASA, supra note 219. It has been argued that the IATA is
itself an example of tight cartelization and effectively serves as a platform for the
international fuel surcharge cartel. RIGAS DOGANIS, FLYING OFF COURSE: THE EcoNOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES, 38-39 (2d ed. 2012).
216

217
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the U.K and Japan via IATA (between 1952 and 2000) and between the U.K. and Singapore via IATA (between 1971 and
2001).221 Similarly, though without mention of the IATA, the
1951 ASA between the U.K and India required airlines to agree
to or at least consult each other regarding tariffs from 1951 until
2004.222 Finally, designated airlines were to consult each other
regarding tariffs on services between the U.K and South Korea
from 1984 to 2001 "whenever possible." 2 23
A closer look at the documentary evidence reveals a number
of turning points in the history of the ASAs above. It is possible
that the amendments were made in response to an awareness
that a requirement for agreement between airlines on tariffs
could be in breach of competition rules, although we have no
documentary evidence to substantiate this. As early as 2000, and
continuing through 2004, there was a discernible increase in dialogue between the states, ranging from initial communication
to consensus, finally resulting in agreement to amend the language of the ASAs. One turning point occurred in 2000 when
the U.K. and Japan signed an MOU, which made clear that "designated airlines ... will not be required to consult each other on
proposed tariffs,"22 4 changing the previous requirement of
agreement on tariffs either "through the rate-fixing machinery"2 2 1 of the IATA or by mutual agreement.
In 2001, the consultation requirement was lifted for designated airlines on routes between the U.K and South Korea ,226
and between the U.K and Singapore.2 2 7 In the case of the U.K
and India, the lifting of this requirement came only in 2005,
from which point forward prior consultation on tariffs was and is
no longer required. 2 28 Furthermore, national authorities agreed

222

See U.K-Japan ASA, supra note 219; U.K-Singapore ASA, supra note 219.
See U.K-India 1951 ASA, supra note 219.

223

See U.K-South Korea ASA, supra note 219.

221

Memorandum of Understanding, U.K-Japan, art. 3, Sept. 22, 2000 (on file
with author).
225 U.K-Japan ASA, supra note 219, 1 2.
226 Memorandum of Understanding Amending the Air Services Agreement
Done at Seoul on 5 March 1984, U.K-S. Kor.,June 29, 2001 (on file with author)
(replacing Article 8 of the 1984 ASA between the U.K and South Korea).
227 Memorandum of Understanding, U.K-Sing., Oct. 25-26, 2001 (on file with
author) (replacing Article 9 of the 1971 ASA between the U.K and Singapore).
228 Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of India Concerning Air Services art. 15, 1 2, U.K-India, Sept. 8, 2005 [hereinafter U.K-India
2005 ASA] (amending the position laid down in Article 6 of the 1951 ASA between the U.K and India, which required that: tariffs shall always be agreed or at
224
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to ensure that tariffs reflect market conditions and to reciprocally approve the other national authority's tariffs.2 29
The ASA between the U.K and Hong Kong (1999) does not
require prior consultation by airlines, whereas the U.K. and Brazil ASA (1999) does not even require filing of tariffs.2 3 0

C. ASA

REVIEWED-EU AND UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

The multilateral ASA between the EU and the United Arab
Emirates (UAE), by way of example as a hub of paramount importance for EU-Far East air traffic, aims to consolidate ASAs
that were agreed upon earlier between each of the Member
States and the UAE."3 It also reinforces in its preamble that
under EU law, agreements that may affect trade between Member States and prevent, restrict, or distort competition cannot be
entered into. 2 3 2 Article 6(1) of the UAE-EU Agreement makes
clear that nothing in earlier bilateral agreements between Member States and the UAE shall
(i) favour the adoption of agreements between undertakings,
decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted practices that prevent or distort competition;
(ii) reinforce the effects of any such agreement, decision or
concerted practice; or
(iii) delegate to private economic operators the responsibility
for taking measures that prevent, distort or restrict
competition.
If the effect of an earlier agreement between the UAE and a
particular Member State contains provisions that are incompatible with the points outlined above, they shall not apply from the
date of the UAE-EU Agreement going forward. 2 34 This template
is to be applied comprehensively to all such instances of incompatibility where an amended or new agreement has been
reached.2 3 5 The above reflects very clearly the language and inleast consulted upon; airlines shall regard rates adopted by IATA; and all tariffs
are ultimately subject to the approval of national authorities).
229 Id. art. 15, 11 1, 3.
230 U.K-Hong Kong ASA, supra note 219, art. 6, 1 3; U.K-Brazil ASA, supra
note 219, 2.
231 Agreement Between the European Community and the United Arab Emirates on Certain Aspects of Air Services, EU-U.A.E., 2008 O.J. (L 28) 21 [hereinafter EU-U.A.E. ASA].
232 Id. at 21.
233 Id. art. 6, 1 1.
234 Id. art. 6, 11 1-2.
235 Id. art. 6, 1 2; see also id. art. 9, 1 3.
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tent of the EU competition rules and clarifies any doubt as to
private firms' (carriers') own responsibility to ensure that agreements and behavior comply with Articles 101 and 102 of the
TFEU.
There are no similar fully multilateral agreements on the
books, however, between the EU and Japan, Thailand, India,
Brazil, Singapore, Hong Kong, or South Korea. In an International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 2004 working paper,
a progress report claims that the "[EU] Member States have now
concluded new agreements or revised existing bilateral agreements with over thirty other ICAO States to permit the designation of European Community carriers on routes to [and] from
The 2002 CJEU open skies judgments23 7
their territories."'2
prompted the removal of nationality clauses in ASAs to ensure
nondiscrimination between carriers with the Community
designation."3
Nonetheless, evidence shows that nationality restrictions in
preexisting bilateral ASAs with EU Member States were fully re-

236 Ownership and Control: Recognizing New Developments 4 (Int'l Civil Aviation
Org., Working Paper A35-WP/96, 2004), available at http://www.icao.int/Meetings/atconf6/Documents/WorkingPapers/ATConf6.WP.94.2.en.pdf.
237 See generally Joined Cases C-466/98, Comm'n v. U.K, 2002 E.C.R. 1-9427;
Case C-467/98, Comm'n v. Den., 2002 E.C.R. 1-9519; Case C-468/98, Comm'n v.
Swed., 2002 E.C.R. 1-9575; Case C-469/98, Comm'n v. Fin., 2002 E.C.R. 1-9627;
Case C-471/98, Comm'n v. Belg., 2002 E.C.R. 1-9681; Case C-472/98, Comm'n v.
Lux., 2002 E.C.R. 1-09741; Case C-475/98, Comm'n v. Austria, 2002 E.C.R. 1-9797;
Case C-466/98, Comm'n v. Ger., 2002 E.C.R. 1-9855. There was "split competence" for air transport prior to 2002 insofar as the Community regulated the
internal market while Member States were free to enter into ASAs with third
countries. Since the "open skies" ruling, the EU has exercised exclusive external
competence for air transport. Although outside the scope of this article, the application of the CJEU's two doctrines on implied external powers (based on
Opinion 1/76 (pursuant to Article 228(1) of the TEEC) and the ERTA doctrine
("European Road Transport Agreement")) is also of interest. See Opinion 1/76 of
the Court ofJustice, Draft Agreement Establishinga European Laying-Up Fundfor Waterway Vessels, 1977 E.C.R. 741; Case 22/70, Comm'n v. Council, 1971 E.C.R. 264; see
also L. Heffernan & C. McAuliffe, External Relations in the Air Transport Sector: The
Court ofJustice and the Open Skies Agreements, 28 E.L. REv., no. 5, 2003, at 601.
238 Following this ruling, the Council agreed upon a standard clause on designation, which is to be used in future negotiations; the clause provides for the
designation of a carrier established in any Member State as a "Community air
carrier" rather than a discriminatory designation, e.g., "U.K. air carrier." Commission Decision on Approving the Standard Clauses for Inclusion in Bilateral Air
Service Agreements Between Member States and Third Countries Jointly Laid
Down by the Commission and the Member States, Annex, 2005 O.J. (C 943) 3.
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moved sometime later: Singapore's in 2006,239 India's in 2008,240
South Korea's in 2008,41 and Japan's in 2009.242 Negotiations
between the EU and Brazil are ongoing 24 3 following a horizontal
agreement on certain aspects of air services in 2009.244

D.

ASAs

AS DEFENSE?

The following section reflects on the feasibility of arguing that
the ASAs identified above between EU Member States and third
countries provided a regulatory framework governing air transport, which was the basis for the 15% reduction in fines.
Elsewhere in this article, two potential layers in the general
regulatory environment, as referred to in the available details of
the Airfreight decision, are identified: the ASA and the competition rules. Some ASAs require designated airlines to consult "locally" and agree on tariffs-that is, independent of the IATAbefore the tariffs can be approved. Other ASAs require airlines
to do this via the IATA mechanism.
As discussed above, a general block exemption existed to facilitate interlining in passenger and cargo services from 1988 to
1996, specifically for "certain categories of agreements, decisions, and concerted practices" concerning joint planning and
coordination of schedules, joint operations, consultations on
passenger and cargo tariffs on scheduled air services, and slot
allocation at airports.24 5 Cargo operations were removed from
the scope of the block exemption in 1997 (with some parts al239 See International Aviation: Singapore, EUR. COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/
transport/modes/air/international aviation/country-index/singaporeen.htm
(last updated Feb. 26, 2013).

240 See InternationalAviation: India, EUR. COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/trans-

port/modes/air/international-aviation/countryindex/indiaen.htm
(last updated Feb. 26, 2013).
241See InternationalAviation: Korea (Republic of), EUR. COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/ international aviation/country_index/south koreaen.htm (last updated Feb. 26, 2013).
242 Press Release, Fur. Comm'n, Breakthrough in EU-Japan Aviation Relations
(Jan. 16, 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseIP-09-64_en.
htm.
243 See InternationalAviation: Brazil, EUR.

COMM'N,

http://ec.europa.eu/trans-

port/modes/air/international aviation/countryindex/brazil_en.htm (last updatedJuly 17, 2013).
244 See Proposalfor a Council Decision on the Signature of the Agreement on Certain
Aspects of Air Services Between the European Community and the Federative Republic of
Brazil, COM (2009) 411 final (Aug. 3, 2009).
245 Council Regulation 3976/87, supra note 160, art. 2, 1 2.
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ready suspended in 1996),46 although a conditional block exemption continued for LATA passenger tariffs until 2007.247
Owing to the changing nature of the regulatory regime for
airlines in the period from 1988 to 2007, which encompasses the
period of infringement for the decision (1999 to 2006), what is
of great significance is when the terms of the ASAs and subsequent MOUs were effective. In other words, an ASA which requires airlines to consult others regarding cargo tariffs after
1997 would place an airline in an uncomfortable position between two layers of regulation: the ASA and the competition
rules.
Already in 2001, the Commission took the preliminary view
that the IATA consultations on cargo tariffs breached EU competition rules. 248 In response, the IATA agreed to no longer set
intra-EEA tariffs from 2002 onwards. 24 9 Apparently, the LATA
continued to facilitate cargo tariffs on non-EEA routes.25 0
It is also clear that carriers continued to discuss and agree
upon tariffs independently from the IATA. Since there was no
exemption after 1997, the practice of agreeing upon tariffswhether multilaterally, and arguably "transparently," via the
IATA, or "locally" by mutual agreement between carriers-prima
facie appears to have breached the EU competition rules. At the
same time, certain ASAs required airlines to consult each other
for some or all of the period from 1997 to 2004.5
The third and final layer in the "regulatory environment" for
airlines is the regulatory lag vis-A-vis liberalization of the European sector and resulting transfer of competency on external
aviation policy to the Commission. With the European Single
Sky (single aviation market), the Commission assumed exclusive
competency in 2004 to enter into and enforce all future ASAs
between the EU and third countries, as well as to investigate existing agreements. 252 Prior to this, Member States drafted, negotiated, and enforced ASAs for their sovereign airspace.2 5 3 In the
Press Release, Commission Takes Preliminary View, supra note 172.
Press Release, Commission Ends Block Exemption, supra note 17.
248 Press Release, Commission Takes Preliminary View, supra note 172.
249 Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, IATA Agrees to End the Joint Setting of Cargo
Rates Within the EEA (Oct. 19, 2001), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressreleaseIP-01-1433_en.htm.
250 See id.
251 See, e.g., U.K.-India 1951 ASA, supra note 219.
252 See Council Regulation 549/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 96) 2.
253 See AcHARD, supra note 134, at 17.
246
247
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wake of the CJEU's open skies judgments, the Council granted
the Commission a mandate to open negotiations with third
countries over the replacement of certain provisions of existing
ASAs and exclusive (external) competence vis-A-vis authority to
negotiate new comprehensive ASAs. 54
A potential further difficulty has arisen in the years since
2004, insofar as the Commission simultaneously applied the
competition rules to the airline sector and yet, though this next
statement is debatable, appears to have neglected to exercise its
exclusive competence to review and renegotiate those comprehensive ASAs with third countries, which compelled airlines to
collaborate on tariffs.

E.

CONCLUSIONS

Below are general conclusions on what is or what should be
considered the "general regulatory environment" in which EU
airlines operate. Over the period of infringement, four possible
(and by no means mutually exclusive) eventualities are
apparent:
1) Airlines were compelled by the ASAs to consult each other
and form common cargo tariffs despite the fact that the
practice breached competition rules, giving rise both to
the 15% reduction in fines and the state action defense.
2) Airlines hold ultimate responsibility (self-regulation) for
ensuring their activities are compatible with the EU competition rules. In short, airlines must not prevent, distort,
or restrict competition.
3) The Commission's position was unclear insofar as having
only drawn attention to the importance of not restricting
air cargo competition on intra-EEA routes in 2001; the
Commission failed to clarify the application of the competition rules to non-EEA routes. 2 5 5 This led to a confusing
state of policy.
4) The Commission undertook to ensure the insertion of the
"Community" (now EU) airline designation into existing
bilateral ASAs between Member States and third countries
(e.g. Singapore, India, South Korea, andJapan), but it has
not yet renegotiated multilateral ASAs with all third coun254 See Council Decision 11323/03, 2003, partially declassified version available at
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/03/st11/st11 323-ex0l.enO3.pdf
(restricted document known as the "Horizontal Mandate").
255 Press Release, Commission Takes Preliminary View, supra note 172.
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tries. The EU common external aviation policy started in
2003.26 The Commission has since proposed to launch
"targeted negotiations seeking to achieve global agreements in the major regions of the world, with the aim of
... ensuring fair competition."2 5 7 Thus, the Commission
has a systematic program for undertaking negotiations for
the conclusion of ASAs between the EU and third countries that will then replace the existing bilateral ASAs between Member States and those countries. In the
meantime, however, existing bilateral ASAs remain in
force. Compounded by considerable variations in these
ASAs, it is argued that this environment exposed, and possibly continues to expose, airlines to a "patchwork of air
service agreements" between the EU and third
countries.2 5 8
Regulation 847/2004 provides that "[a]ll existing bilateral
agreements between Member States and third countries that
contain provisions contrary to Community law should be
amended or replaced by new agreements that are wholly compatible with Community law." 2 5 9 What is unclear is where responsibility ultimately falls for identifying incompatibilities and
initiating change. 260 The Regulation goes on to say: "Without
prejudice to the Treaty, and in particular Article 300 thereof,
Member States may wish to make amendments to existing agreements and make provision to manage their implementation until such time as an agreement concluded by the Community
enters into force."2 6 1
256 External Aviation Policy - Horizontal Agreements, EUR. COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/international aviation/external-aviation-policy/
horizontal_agreementsen.htm (last updated Feb. 20, 2013).
257 Council Conclusions on Developing the Agenda for the Community's External Aviation Policy, supra note 170, at 11.
258 See MARTIN BARTLIK, THE IMPACT OF EU LAW ON THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION 114 (2007).
259 Council Regulation 847/2004, supra note 15, at 7, 9.
260 Id. According to Article 4(3) of the TFEU, although the EU has competence to carry out activities in research, technological development, and space,
Member States are not prevented from exercising their competence. TFEU, supra
note 22, art. 4. Article 4(2) of the TFEU provides that the EU and Member States
shall share competence in areas such as transport. Id. It is important to note that
the European Parliament and the Council may promulgate legislative provisions
for air transport under Article 100(2) of the TFEU. Id. art. 100. Thus, exercise of
EU competence requires a specific mandate. See id. arts. 4, 100.
261 Regulation 847/2004, supra note 15, at 9.
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It appears from the above statements that while contrary provisions "should be amended or replaced," the Commission has
exclusive external competence, and therefore there is no requirement for Member States to amend incompatible features
of existing bilateral ASAs.2 62 Indeed, until the EU targets a particular third country for negotiation of a new multilateral agreement, Member States "may wish to make amendments" to
existing ASAs, but merely on behalf of, and strictly upon notification to, the Commission.
What results is regulatory lag in the
European air transport sector.
In other words, until the EU prioritizes a third country and
secures a new comprehensive multilateral, 264 lacunae such as
those that could encourage price coordination will continue to
contribute to a general regulatory environment deserving of either a discount on fines or even an annulment of the infringement decision.
V. AFTERTHOUGHTS
This article has given an overview of the legal framework
within which the fine was imposed and the 15% reduction for
the "general regulatory environment" was applied in the Commission's decision in the Airfreight case. It has been observed

that in the airline industry (where, for most of the EU's history,
collaboration and cooperation between airlines when setting
tariffs was exempted from competition law), cooperation between airlines is often considered inherent because of the need
for interlining. The most significant feature affecting the application of the mitigation is the operation of various ASAs, and
their effect has been considered by using the example of the
U.K-third country ASAs in operation at the time of the
infringements.
262

Id. (emphasis added).

263

Id.

Proposals for a Council Decision regarding the signature on behalf of the
EU of provisional agreements with third countries is also an (interim) possibility,
particularly "where compliance with the law of the [EU] should be ensured
through amending or complementing existing provisions in bilateral air services
agreements between Member States and third countries." See Proposalfor a Council
Decision on the Signature, on Behalf of the European Union, and ProvisionalApplication
of the Agreement on Certain Aspects of Air Services Between the European Union and the
Macao Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, at 2, COM
(2012) 28 final (Feb. 2, 2012).
264
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It is hoped that a final version of the Commission's decision
will be made public. It is the authors' further hope that the published version will clarify what "the general regulatory environment" in the context of this infringement means. While access
to the Commission's confidential file might remain difficult,
what one can be sure of at this point, owing to the grounds for
appeal, is that the ASAs between Member States and third countries are a significant element. The authors have sought in this
article to interpret the possible grounds of mitigation in the
"general regulatory environment." It may be that the ASAs are
the only ground for the mitigation. But it is also possible that
though the airlines are appealing how the requirements imposed by these ASAs are considered by the Commission (both
when determining that there has been an infringement and
when setting the fine), other factors in the regulatory environment, such as cargo alliances, are relevant, too. In any case, if
the ASAs are the only ground for the application of the mitigation, it is interesting that it has been applied to all airlines, irrespective of which flight routes they operated and therefore
irrespective of the extent to which their operations fell within
the various ASAs.
While the consensus view is that the Commission often exercises great discretion in issuing fines for breaches of the EU
competition rules, in the Airfreight decision, the Commission's
reduction of the fine for all participants with respect to "the
general regulatory environment" appears to be quite novel. This
is particularly interesting because the discretion was exercised
with respect to the aviation sector, which has "enjoyed" the
rather special treatment competition authorities have given it,
especially in the past. According to the Commission, the regulatory environment can be seen as encouraging price coordination; whether it goes so far as to impose it, as some airlines
argue, is a question yet unanswered.
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